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BROKER SILENCE AND RULE 10b-5: EXPANDING
THE DUTY TO DISCLOSE*
IT has long been unclear whether rule lOb-5 of the Securities and Exchange
Commission-a broad prohibition of fraudulent practices in securities trans-
actions-imposes liability for total nondisclosure of material information.1
A significant expansion of the scope of the rule may therefore have been
effected by a recent SEC decision 2 which imposed an administrative penalty
for nondisclosure 3 on a stockbroker trading for discretionary accounts on
dividend information received from a business associate who was a corporate
insider. The ruling, moreover, may be a first step in the imposition of a more
general duty of disclosure upon the stockbroker.
While the common law clearly imposed liability for misrepresentations and
half-truths, 4 there has been substantial judicial confusion concerning the exist-
ence of liability for mere nondisclosure.5 The general common law rule has
been that total silence can not operate as a fraud unless the defendant is, for
some special reason, under an affirmative duty of disclosure., Some courts have
derived such a duty from the presence of a fiduciary relationship, 7 such as that
*In the Matter of Cady, Roberts & Co., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No.
6668, Nov. 8, 1961.
1. While it has been clear that misrepresentations and material omissions, or half-
truths, fall within the proscription of the rule, there have been few cases involving total
silence. The major case on this point, Joseph v, Farnsworth Radio & Television Corp., 99
F. Supp. 701 (S.D.N.Y. 1951), did not reach the issue of silence, the case being dismissed
on other grounds.
2. In the Matter of Cady, Roberts & Co., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No.
6668, Nov. 8, 1961.
3. In one sense, there will never be a case of total non-disclosure regarding securities.
So long as a corporation publishes a financial statement, or issues a prospectus, there will
have been some representations made about the company. The silence referred to then is
only silence, concerning the company's condition, on the part of one of the parties to a trans-
action, at the time of the transaction.
4. One is under a duty not only "to state, truthfully what he actually tells, but also
not to suppress any fact within his knowledge which will materially change or alter the
effects of the facts stated." Equitable Life Ins. Co. v. Halsey, Stuart & Co., 312 U. S.
410, 425 (1941); see also 3 RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 529 (1938); PROSSER, TORTS 534
(2d ed. 1955).
5. This confusion stems from the common law distinction between misrepresentation
and nondisclosure. Whereas the former would provide grounds for a tort action of deceit,
the latter would not. See, e.g., Peek v. Gurney, L.R. 6 H.L. 377 (1873).
6. One party to a business transaction is under a duty to exercise reasonable care to
disclose to the other before the transaction is consummated
(a) such matter as the other is entitled to know because of a fiduciary or other
similar relation of trust and confidence between them ....
3 RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 551(2) (1938) ; see also PROSSER, TORTS 534-35 (2d ed. 1955).
7. E.g., Hotchkiss v. Fischer, 136 Kan. 530, 16 P.2d 531 (1932) ; Gerdes v. Reynolds,
28 N.Y.S.2d 622 (1941). But see Buckley v. Buckley, 230 Mich. 504, 202 N.W. 955 (1925).
BROKER SILENCE
between corporate insiders and noncontrolling stockholders ;8 others have de-
rived this duty from "special circumstances"' requiring affirmative disclosure
-a criterion similar in practice to the first.9
Rule lob-5,10 promulgated by the Securities and Exchange Commission
pursuant to section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,11 declares
it to be unlawful:
for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or instru-
mentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails, or of any facility of
any national securities exchange
(a) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) to make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state
a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in
light of the circumstances under which they were made, not mis-
leading, or
(c) to engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates
or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person,
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
The rule provides a broad framework within which the SEC and the courts
may prohibit any practice or device which they might deem unfair. 12 Judicial
statements have been made that, under these provisions:
It is unlawful for an insider, such as a majority stockholder, to pur-
chase the stock of minority shareholders without disclosing material
facts affecting the value of the stock, known to the majority stockholder
by virtue of his inside position but not known to the selling minority
stockholders, which information would have affected the judgment of the
sellers.la
While statements of this type may be interpreted as imposing liability under
certain circumstances for total nondisclosure, each of the decisions involved
half-truths which provided an alternative basis for liability.'" In Joseph v.
8. Corporate insiders have been defined as officers, directors, and "every person who
is directly or indirectly the beneficial owner of more that 10 per centum of any class of
any equity security ... ." Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 16(a), 48 Stat. 896 (1934),
15 U.S.C. § 78p(a) (1958).
9. Strong v. Repide, 213 U.S. 419 (1909). See BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONs 213 (rev.
ed. 1946) ; Comment, The Prospects for Rule X-1OB-5: An Emerging Remedy for De-
frauded Investors, 59 YALE L.J. 1120, 1125 (1950); Comment, 39 CALIF. L. REv. 429,
430-31 (1951).
10. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1949).
11. 48 Stat. 891 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78j (b) (1958).
12. The term "fraud" as employed in the context of the securities acts was intended to
be "not limited to common law concepts, but includes all deceitful practices contrary to the
plain rules of common honesty." Loss, The SEC and The Broker-Dealer, 1 VAND. L.
REv. 516, 517 (1948), citing People v. Federated Radio Corp., 244 N.Y. 33, 38, 154 N.E.
655, 657-58 (1926).
13. Speed v. Transamerica Corp., 99 F. Supp. 808, 828-29 (D. Del. 1951).
14. Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 73 F. Supp. 798 (E.D. Pa. 1947); Fry v.
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Farnsworth Radio & Television Corp.,15 the one case which involved total
nondisclosure, the question of fraud was not reached; the case was dismissed
on the ground that privity was lacking between the parties."" The judge ex-
pressed the opinion that there had clearly not been a violation of subsections
(a) and (b), but he acknowledged that, had privity existed, there might still
have been a violation of subsection (c).17 None of the cases suggests that any
duty of affirmative disclosure should extend beyond corporate insiders.
Persons acting in the dual capacities of broker and dealer, however, have
been held liable for failure to disclose their dual role.' 8 Although this liabil-
ity may be founded in part on a fiduciary relationship concept similar to that
applied to insiders, it appears to be primarily based upon a theory of implied
misrepresentation: because persons dealing with a broker will ordinarily
assume that he is acting solely as an agent, nondisclosure of his additional
role as a principal constitutes a misleading omission.19 Broker-dealers, more-
over, have been held to an affirmative duty of disclosure where they were
effecting transactions for insiders who they knew to be in possession of non-
public material information. 20 These cases, however, rather than imposing
liability on the grounds of a fiduciary relationship, have apparently viewed
the brokers as conspirators in the insiders' scheme to defraud.21
The recent decision by the SEC, In the Matter of Cady, Roberts & Co.,22
may have expanded in several respects the scope of liability for total nondis-
closure. On the morning of November 25, 1959, the directors of Curtiss-
Wright Co. met to discuss the quarterly dividend of the company's common
stock. Among the directors was J. Cheever Cowdin, a registered representa-
tive of the brokerage firm of Cady, Roberts & Co. At approximately 11:00
a.m. the board, in compliance with a New York Stock Exchange rule,23
Schumaker, 83 F. Supp. 476 (E.D. Pa. 1947) ; Charles Hughes & Co. v. SEC, 139 F.2d
434 (2d Cir. 1943).
It should also be noted that these transactions involved face-to-face purchases from
persons already shareholders.
15. 99 F. Supp. 701 (S.D.N.Y. 1951).
16. It appeared that plaintiffs had purchased their stock on the market long after
the defendants had sold the last of their stock, so that there was no possibility that the
defendants could have sold to the plaintiffs. Id. at 706.
17. Ibid.
18. E.g., Charles Hughes & Co. v. SEC, 139 F.2d 434 (2d Cir. 1943); Hughes v.
SEC, 174 F.2d 969 (D.C. Cir. 1949) ; Hughes & Treat, 22 S.E.C. 623 (1946). These cases
were brought under § 15 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 893 (1934), 15
U.S.C. § 78(o) (1958).
19. For a thorough discussion of this facet of the broker-client relationship, see SEC,
REPORT ON THE FEASIBILITY AND ADVISABILITY OF THE COMPLETE SEGREGATION OF THE
FUNCTIONS OF DEALER AND BROKER at xiv-xvi (1936).
20. Fry v. Schumaker, 83 F. Supp. 476 (E.D. Pa. 1947); William I. Hay, 19 S.E.C.
397 (1945).
21. See, e.g., Fry v. Schumaker, 83 F. Supp. 476, 478 (E.D. Pa. 1947); In re Van
Alstyne, Noel & Co., 33 S.E.C. 311, 339 (1952).
22. SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 6668, November 8, 1961.
23. NEw YoRE STOCK EXCHANGE, COMPANY MANUAL, Article 111(4), Current Form
of Listing Agreement, p. A-28 (1958).
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authorized transmission to the Exchange of the information that the dividend
had been cut from $.625 to $.375 per share. A typing problem delayed the
transmission of the telegram, and the announcement, although transmitted to
Western Union at 11:12 a.m., did not reach the Exchange until 12:29 p.m.-
Ordinarily, this procedure would have been completed by approximately
11:30 a.m.2 4 It was also customary for a telegram to be sent to the Dow
Jones Ticker Service; but, "apparently through some mistake or inadvertence,"
the message did not reach the service until 11:45 a.m. and announcement of
the dividend cut did not appear on the Dow Jones Ticker Tape until 11:48
a.m. After the dividend action, and after the Secretary of Curtiss-Wright had
been sent out to notify the Exchange and Dow Jones, the meeting was re-
cessed. Cowdin immediately telephoned the offices of Cady, Roberts & Co.
and left a message for a partner in the firm, Robert Gintel, that the
dividend had been cut. Gintel, in the two days prior to the dividend
meeting, had been selling Curtiss-Wright stock, and had disposed of
6,500 shares, 4,300 of which had been sold on the morning of Novem-
ber 25, but prior to 11:00 a.m. Upon receipt of the dividend informa-
tion,25 he placed two additional sell orders for discretionary accounts ;26 one to
sell 2,000 shares for 10 accounts, the other to sell short 27 5,000 shares for 11
accounts. These orders were executed approximately half an hour before
announcement of the dividend cut appeared on the ticker; they were put
through at 403/4 and 40ys. Shortly after the dividend announcement appeared
on the ticker, the Exchange suspended trading in Curtiss-Wright. When
trading was resumed two hours later, the stock opened at 36/, and closed
for the day at 34ys. Gintel was fined $3,000 by the Exchange for the trans-
actions, and was subsequently suspended from the New York Stock Ex-
change for 20 days as the result of administrative action brought against him
by the SEC for violation of rule lOb-5. 2s No attempt was made by pur-
chasers of the stock to hold Gintel civilly liable.2 9
24. Letter from Mr. Joseph G. Connolly, New York attorney. (On file in the Yale
Law Library.)
25. Gintel, of course, knew that the information had been received from Cowdin and
that Cowdin was an insider in Curtiss-Wright. SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No.
6668, p. 3.
26. A discretionary account is one for which the broker has the power to conduct
transactions at his discretion without first obtaining the specific permission of the account
holder. See LEFFLER, THE STOCK MARKET 166-67 (2d ed. 1957).
27. The short sales involved were "against the box," i.e., they were sold against the
firm's holdings, and the sales were covered later from specific accounts. Thus, when
Gintel covered all of the discretionary holdings, he found himself with 950 shares un-
covered, and these he allocated to his wife, bringing her total to 1,450 shares. SEC Securi-
ties Exchange Act Release No. 6668, p. 11 n.30.
28. The SEC action was brought under § 19(a) (3) of the Securities Exchange Act,
48 Stat. 898 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78s(a) (3) (1960). The remedies available to the SEC
were imposition of a fine and/or suspension from the exchange.
29. See note 35 infra and accompanying text.
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The Commission, in the Cady, Roberts case, devotes a major portion of its
opinion to establishing the scope of the insider's affirmative duty of dis-
closure. It holds that this duty is not limited to face-to-face transactions,"
nor is it limited to the traditional "fiduciary relationship" situation of pur-
chases from existing shareholders; it arises out of any sale of stock.3 ' The
Commission then goes on to state that this special obligation is not restricted
to corporate insiders, but has instead as its basis:
first, the existence of a relationship giving access, directly or indirectly,
to information intended to be available only for a corporate purpose
and not for the personal benefit of anyone, and second, the inherent
unfairness involved where a party takes advantage of such information
knowing it is unavailable to those with whom he is dealing.3 2
The SEC does not fully clarify its reasons for applying this rule to Gintel. It
seems to focus primarily on his partnership in a firm with which his in-
formant, clearly a corporate insider, was associated.33 The Commission ap-
pears also to be influenced by the fact that Gintel was a stockbroker.34 His
liability is analogized to that of a broker who effects transactions for an in-
sider with knowledge that the insider possesses non-public material informa-
tion. Finally, having established the duty of disclosure, the Commission points
30. The distinction between face-to-face transactions and those effected on a securities
exchange stems from the holding in Goodwin v. Agassiz, 283 Mass. 358 (1933), that a
director need not disclose material inside information in dealings on an open securities
market. This view, however, has become increasingly unacceptable: "Dishonest directors
should not find absolution from retributive justice by concealing their identity from their
victims under the mask of the stock exchange." BALLANTINE, CORPORATioNS 216 (rev. ed.
1946).
31. In the past, there has been some argument, derived from the common law, that
purchases and sales are distinguishable because a director stands in a fiduciary relation-
ship only to those who are existing shareholders. In Cady, Roberts, registrant cites
Hotchkiss v. Fischer, 136 Kan. 530, 16 P.2d 531 (1932), in support of its contention that
a fiduciary duty exists only between insiders and sellers. The Commission, however, points
out that this is no longer the case, noting that, in 16 Fed. Reg. 7928 (1951), the words
"by a purchaser" had been specifically stricken from the title of rule 10b-5, so that it
simply read, "Employment of manipulative and deceptive devices." Further, citing Judge
Learned Hand, in Gratz v. Claughton, 187 F.2d 46 (2d Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 341 U.S.
920 (1951), the Commission states that "there is no valid reason why persons who
purchase stock from an officer, director, or other person having the responsibilities of an
'insider' should not have the same protection afforded by disclosure of special information
as persons who sell stock to them." Securities Exchange Act Release No. 6668, p. 9.
32. Id. at 6.
33. Id. at 7.
34. In response to the argument that "any requirement that a broker-dealer make
disclosure of 'adverse factors disclosed by his own analysis' would create uncertainty and
confusion," the Commission states that there could be no uncertainty concerning the type
of information involved in the facts of Cady, Roberts, but does not deny the existence of
broker liability. SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 6668, p. 10. It is true, however,
that this in itself only suggests that a broker may be under a general duty of disclosure,
not that such a duty is based on the fact that he is a broker.
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out that the prohibited transactions include trading for discretionary ac-
counts and execution of orders, not merely trading for one's own account.
The SEC's imposition of a broad duty of disclosure on insiders is reason-
able as a matter of policy and sufficiently supported by the precedents. Given
this duty, imposition of administrative sanctions 3r on Gintel because of his
business relationship to Cowdin can be justified on what may be termed a
"one economic unit" theory; in certain situations, two or more persons may be
members of a single economic unit such that profits resulting from action by
any one of them will accrue to the group as a whole, not to the individuals
separately. It has been held that, where the law forbids short-swing trans-
actions by an insider in the securities of his corporation, this prohibition
will extend to his wife, for the benefit in either case would accrue to the same
economic unit.36 The present situation would seem somewhat analogous: the
benefit that would have accrued to Cowdin, had he undertaken the trans-
actions involved, would have come through increased customer goodwill to
the firm. And the same result was achieved through Gintel's trading on the
basis of Cowdin's information.3 7 The use of this business relationship as a
basis for Gintel's subjection to disciplinary action might be justified more
simply on Gintel's "special access" to the information on which he allegedly
acted. Numerous types of business relationships, other than that existing in
the Cady, Roberts situation may, of course, produce the same effect, and it
would be impossible to police them all. It does not seem unreasonable, how-
35. The imposition of civil liability by private parties might, of course, present several
difficulties not involved in the present situation and beyond the scope of this Note. One would
have to consider, for example, whether particular persons had been injured; also whether
the broker should be forced to repair the injury even though he did not himself receive
the "excess profit."
36. See Broffe v. Horton, 172 F2d 489, 494 (2d Cir. 1949); 2 Loss, SEcUaITIEs
REGULATION 1101 (2d ed. 1961).
Such transactions are prohibited by § 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
48 Stat. 896 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1958), which provides that:
for the purpose of preventing the unfair use of information which may have been
obtained by such beneficial owner, director, or officer by reason of his relationship
to the issuer, any profit realized by him from any purchase and sale, or any sale
and purchase, of any equity security of such issuer . . . within any period of less
than six months . . . shall inure to and be recoverable by the issuer ....
37. While the ultimate result of this increased customer goodwill will be greater
profits for the partners, it is not presently feasible to allocate the benefit to individuals.
Thus evasion cannot be prevented by simply making Cowdin, the insider, return his share
of the benefit. Compare Rattner v. Lehman, 98 F. Supp. 1009 (S.D.N.Y. 1951), aff'd,
193 F.2d 564 (2d Cir. 1952). In that case, a partnership, without the knowledge of one of
the partners who was a director of a corporation, bought and sold stock in that corporation
at a profit, and after the partner-director learned of the transaction, he paid over to the
corporation his share of the profits from the transaction. It was held that a stockholder,
suing on behalf of himself and all other stockholders, could not recover on behalf of the
corporation from any of the partners the remainder of the profit realized from the trans-
action.
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ever, to single out certain formalized relationships which are particularly
likely to provide such access. 38 This is especially true where the participants
are brokers, for such persons play an important role in the operation of the
securities market and also are likely to make extensive use of inside informa-
tion.
A different, and perhaps more difficult, problem is presented if Gintel was
held subject to discipline solely because of his position as a broker. "Special
access" might again provide a justification.3 9 An inequitable situation might
result, however, since other investors, with perhaps equal access, are placed
under no such duty.40 A more satisfactory ground for holding the broker may
be found by focusing on his position as a part of the policing mechanism of
the stock market. It has long been recognized that the standards of the
"horse trade" are inappropriate to a large, impersonal securities market.
This rule has been reflected not only in strict governmental regulation, but
also in the responsibilities assumed by those groups who carry on the opera-
tions of the market. Cady, Roberts & Co. is a member of both the New York
Stock Exchange and the National Association of Securities Dealers.4' Each
of these organizations is governed by a code of fair practices, regulated not
by common law principles, but by the more stringent standards of "fair
dealing." 4 Extensive policing functions have been undertaken by the ex-
changes under these codes with the purpose of buttressing public confidence
in the market as a place where fair play and discipline are normal procedures. 43
38. While every industry might provide its members with special access to information
regarding the other companies in that industry, the brokerage business is one in which
information itself is a prime commodity.
39. Corporate insiders are usually in the best position to obtain information con-
cerning a security's worth. Brokers and dealers, though less favorably situated, are
in a position far superior to that of the ordinary investor. Therefore, the corporate
insider and the corporation may have a broader duty to disclose than that owed by
independent brokers and dealers, who in turn have a broader duty than that owed
by the ordinary in-and-out investor, who may in their [sic] turn have no higher
duty to disclose than that imposed by common law, which was usually no duty at all.
Comment, The Prospects for Rule 10b-5: An Emerging Remedy for Defrauded Investors,
59 YALE L.J. 1120, 1143 (1950).
40. See Testimony of P. T. Byrne, Regional Administrator, SEC, New York, N.Y.
Hearings on the Securities and Exchange Commission before a Subcommittee of the
House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 725-26
(1952).
41. The National Association of Securities Dealers, an organization similar in most
respects to the New York Stock Exchange, regulates the activities of those broker-dealers
who trade in securities on the over-the-counter market.
42. The purpose of the NASD Rules of Fair Practice is stated to be "... to cope
with those methods of doing business which, while technically outside the area of definite
illegality, are nevertheless unfair both to customer and to decent competitor, and seriously
damaging to the mechanism of the free and open market." NATIoNAL AssociArxoN or
SECURITIEs DrzMkLs, RULES OF FA.m PRACTIcE E-131(1958).
43. As mentioned in text at note 28, su~pra, the New York Stock Exchange imposed a
$3,000 fine in the present case long before any disciplinary action by the SEC. It was
[Vol. 71 :736
BROKER SILENCE
In this context, it would seem appropriate for the SEC to impose upon the
broker a duty of disclosure not imposed upon the ordinary investor. More-
over, the sanction applied by the SEC-suspension of Gintel from the Ex-
change for a period of twenty days-is particularly fitting to a "policing
function" theory of liability.
The scope of the insider's duty has been defined in quite general terms as
one to disclose information known to him through his relationship to the
corporation but not known to the public and which, if known, would influence
investors' actions.44 It is true that some uncertainty is created by the
vagueness of this standard and that this uncertainty may be greater in some
respects for the broker than for the corporate insider. It may also have more
serious consequences for the broker, because the insider is precluded, at most,
from trading in the securities of his own corporation,45 whereas the broker
may be foreclosed from trading in any securities about which he has received
inside information. It would seem, however, that administration of the rule
need not prove unworkable if practical considerations guide its application. 46
Upon receiving information from any source, a broker will ordinarily be
faced with three basic questions:
(1) Is the information true, or merely rumor or opinion?
(2) Is it information which would have a significant effect on the price
of a security?
(3) Is it already sufficiently available to the public that no further dis-
closure would be required?
None of these questions presented any problem under the peculiar facts in
Cady, Roberts: there was little doubt as to the truth of the information re-
ceived by Gintel; the importance of the dividend information was clearly re-
flected by the Exchange's requirement that such information be immediately
reported by the issuer ;47 and the reporting requirement would likewise seem
to have solved the problem of ascertaining whether the particular information
was public.
48
explicitly stated by the Commission that this fact caused its penalty to be considerably
lighter than it would otherwise have been. SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 6668,
pp. 12-13.
44. See note 14 supra.
45. The corporate insider is relatively free to trade on information received from
associates in other corporations in exchange for information concerning his own corpora-
tion. See Hearings, supra note 40, at 725-26. But see Blau v. Lehman, 30 U.S.L. WEEK
4125 (U.S. Jan. 22, 1962).
46. The alternative, a rigidly defined rule, probably could not be drafted so as to be
effective without definitions so complex as to render the rule unworkable.
47. See note 23 supra and accompanying text.
48. The SEC assumed that Gintel knew that the information was not yet on the
ticker. Had they not made this assumption, there might have been some question as to
the fairness of imposing liability because of the improbability, at the time when Gintel
sold, that such information would not be on the tape. However, it would perhaps not be
unreasonable to hold that a broker can not raise, as a defense, a defect in some other part
19621
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The abovementioned questions, however, might present certain problems in
fact situations more common than that which occurred in Cady, Roberts.
The broker, unlike the corporate insider, is always dealing with relayed, or
second-hand information, and he may often have difficulty evaluating the re-
liability of that information. A broker should not be held responsible, therefore,
unless the information (1) concerns material occurrences which are facts, not
conjecture (i.e., those events which have already occurred, and are not merely
likely to occur in the future),49 and (2) is given by someone who the broker
has good reason to believe is an insider. 0
Once a broker has determined that a given item of information is reliable,
he must decide whether it is sufficiently material to warrant disclosure. Be-
cause of his expertise in the dynamics of the securities market, the broker
should be in a unique position to estimate the effect that the information
would have on the market. Thus, for most of the information which a broker
receives, the exercise of his discretion will determine whether it is to be
disclosed. A fairly specific rule might be devised, however, for those types of
information which it is felt will always require disclosure.5 1
The third question which a broker must answer-whether the information is
sufficiently unavailable to the public that its use would be unfair-would
present serious problems were it applicable to all the information received from
various sources by the broker. For, unlike the insider, the broker is removed
from the source of the information; he does not have the same ability to
determine the extent to which the information has been made available to
the public. But if the broker's duty were limited to information received from
an insider, the problem would be manageable. Not only would this restriction
limit the occurrence of the problem; it would also confine it to situations
where it could be most easily handled, for the broker should be able to ascer-
of the policing machinery, but must check the matter himself especially where the effort
necessary is so slight.
49. Brokers will then not be faced with the difficult task of evaluating the reliability
of insider predictions which, albeit well intentioned, are simply the well-informed guesses
of individuals and might differ substantially from guesses made by other individuals in
a similar position.
50. These limitations would also tend to eliminate the likelihood of a flood of rumors
being disseminated over the ticker.
The problem of determining who is an insider is not as difficult as it might appear.
The New York Stock Exchange requires every firm to possess fairly complete data on
the business connections of its clients (or their spouses), which makes it easy to deter-
mine who is a corporate officer or director, and the SEC requires that all major
beneficial owners of equity securities register their holdings with the Commission. See
LEFFLER, THE STOCK MARKET (2d ed. 1957) ; Securities Exchange Act, § 16(a), 48 Stat.
896 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78p(a) (1958).
51. In addition to its rule on dividend information (see note 23 supra), the Ex-
change requires immediate reporting of certain other corporate events, e.g., redemption
or cancellation of issues; corporation's purchase of its own securities, etc. See NEW
YORK STocK EXCHANGE, COMPANY MANUAL, Current Form of Listing Agreement, pp.
A-18 to A-28 (1958).
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tain from his inside source the extent to which the information has been made
public.
Finally, one might consider the range of activities for which disclosure
may be required. One aspect of this problem is whether the possibility of
disciplinary action will effectively force a broker in possession of inside in-
formation to make disclosure before carrying through transactions which he
would have undertaken without such knowledge. A broker who has deter-
mined, through his own financial analysis, that a security is ripe for purchase
or sale may find that receipt of certain information regarding that security will
bar him from taking action without disclosure, even though the inside infor-
mation served only to confirm an independently reached decision. The SEC
in Cady, Roberts intimated that a broker might not be disciplined for imple-
menting a decision arrived at prior to the aquisition of the inside information.
But the facts in the case illustrate the difficulty of obtaining the proof necessary
for exculpation under such a theory. Gintel had commenced a series of sales
prior to receipt of the information, and yet he was unable to make a convinc-
ing argument against the imposition of liability.52 In situations where the
broker has merely made a decision prior to receipt of the inside information,
but has taken no action on his decision, the SEC rule is tantamount to the
imposition of an absolute liability. Imposition of penalties in such cases might
seem unfair, since the broker has not really made use of any inside information.
But the goals to be achieved by strict regulation of the securities market 53 are
sufficiently important to warrant the occasional payment of this price. Further,
it is consistent with the concept of the broker as a guardian of the securities
market that there be times when his duty as a policeman override his duty to
his customers and their right to the benefits of his analysis.5 4 It might even
be argued that the broker is .under an obligation to make certain that informa-
tion which should be made public is in fact made public and that mere non-
disclosure would constitute a breach of his duty. 55 The very fact that, as a
broker, he is especially likely to discover information before it becomes public,
argues in favor of imposing such special duties on the broker as a policeman
of the securities markets.
52. Gintel had disposed of 4,300 shares of Curtiss-Wright prior to 11:00 a.m. on
November 25, and sold an additional 7,000 shares after 11:00. Thus, he was unable to
sustain the burden of proof even though he had already disposed of almost 40% of his
day's total before receipt of the information.
53. See note 42 sipra and text at note 43 supra.
54. SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 6668, p. 12. Thus, it would appear
that there are times when "a policeman's lot is not an 'appy one." GILBERT & SULLIVAN,
THE PIRATES OF PENZANCE (1880).
55. Since the information, but for a fault in the system, would be public, the broker
would be no worse off in this case than any investor who has decided to sell a stock,
and who, before he can act on his decision, watches it lose its value as a news item con-
cerning that security appears on the ticker. No one would contend that such an investor was
deprived unjustly of any profit.
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Another aspect of the problem concerns the degree of broker participation
in a transaction necessary to warrant disclosure. A continuum of possible
situations exists, ranging from the broker's trading for his own account, at
one extreme, to his doing nothing with the information, at the other. For pur-
poses of analysis, however, it may be satisfactory to examine the following
situations:
(1) Trading by the broker for his own account on the basis of the
information;
(2) Trading for discretionary accounts (the situation in the present
case) ;
(3) Offering advice to a client, who then makes the final decision as to
whether a transaction will be undertaken ; and
(4) Excuting a buy or sell order for a client without proferring any in-
formation.
Assuming that there is to be some duty of disclosure, it should, of course,
apply in the case where a broker is trading for himself.50 Imposition of the duty
in situation (2) would seem equally sound, for the broker is again the motivat-
ing force in a transaction where one side realizes a gain as the result of the
misuse of information not available to the other. It is true that the broker is
not himself making a direct profit, but even if this might render civil liability
inappropriate, it should not make disciplinary action unreasonable.r7 This is
especially true since the broker is still acting in a business context, presumably
for the purpose of creating customer goodwill and increasing commissions.
The same justifications would seem to apply to situation (3), even though the
broker is not now the sole motivating factor. Situation (4) presents a difficult
problem. It may be argued that a broker in such a case has acted merely as an
agent, and that his inside information should not be considered since it was
not conveyed, and therefore played no role in the transaction. But non-public
information possessed by a broker will in all likelihood play some role, albeit
indiscernible, in any transaction to which he is an advisor. The most satis-
factory solution, therefore, would be to place upon the broker a duty to dis-
close all material inside information as soon as he practically can. 5
It is impossible to predict with any certainty how far the SEC will in
practice carry the implications of the Cady, Roberts case. The decision, of
course, might be held applicable solely to one in the dual capacity of a broker
and the business partner of an insider, and then only if he acts on information
which, under an established rule, requires immediate public disclosure and
obviously should not have been received by him prior to such publication. Such
a reading, however, is too narrow. While the language of the opinion does not
clearly indicate that the SEC intends to impose special duties on the broker as
56. See note 18 supra.
57. See note 35 sipra.
58. This should mean that the broker is not to wait until the occassion of a trans-
action arises, but should report the information when it comes to his attention.
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such, 0 the decision has apparently been viewed in business circles as strongly
suggestive of such a policy. Taken in the context of other recent SEC
tendencies to impose stricter standards upon brokers, 60 it does suggest that the
broker should not regard himself as being in the position of an ordinary
investor; he would be well advised to act on the assumption that he is exposed
to the risk of penalties for total nondisclosure. The more difficult question con-
cerns the range of types of information and activities which the prohibition
will encompass. While the SEC confined itself to a holding on the narrow
situation in the present case,61 it is likely that the Cady, Roberts decision is a
warning that it will move in the direction of expanding the scope of liability.
59. See text at notes 33 & 34 supra.
60. E.g., Berko v. SEC, CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 91115 (2d Cir., Dec. 7, 1961);
Kahn v. SEC, CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 1 91116 (2d Cir., Dec. 7, 1961); SEC v. Aldred
Inv. Trust et al., No. 2885 (S.D.N.Y., Aug. 11, 1961).
61. SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 6668, p. 1.
